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Abstract
We document interpersonal violence as a dimension of the resource curse. We
rely on a historical natural experiment in the United States, where mineral discover-
ies occurred sometimes before, sometimes after formal institutions were established
in the county of discovery. In places where mineral discoveries occurred before
formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita histor-
ically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and
assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is compa-
rable to the effect of education or income. Our results imply that short-term and
quasi-exogenous variations in the institutional environment can lead to large and
persistent differences in cultural and institutional development.
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“It is manifest that during the time men live without a common
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is
called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man.
[. . . ] The nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting but in the
known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to
the contrary.” (Hobbes 1651, page 262)
1 Introduction
The way in which natural resource endowments shape short- and long-run eco-
nomic and political outcomes has been the subject of a vast literature.1 In partic-
ular, natural resource windfalls have been shown to have a negative and persistent
influence on economic outcomes and institutional quality —the so-called resource
curse— particularly when they occur in the context of weakly institutionalized
polities as highlighted by Mehlum et al. (2006). More recently, various studies
have focused on violence as a particular aspect of the resource curse. For example,
variations in natural resource endowments or prices have been associated with a
higher prevalence of violence in Africa (Lei and Michaels 2014 and Berman et al.
2015), in Colombia (Dube and Vargas 2013), in Peru (Arago´n and Rud 2013), in
Mexico (Castillo et al. 2014), and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Sa´nchez
de la Sierra 2015). All of these studies deal with contexts in which the state is weak
or absent and conclude that natural resources lead to violence by organized groups
such as warlords, drug gangs, or rebel groups. This violent curse is persistent, as
suggested by Buonanno et al. (2015) who report that the Sicilian Mafia originated
from 19th century commodity price shocks.
In this paper, we take advantage of the variation in the relative timings of
state development and mineral discoveries in the United States to study how the
relationship between mineral resources and interpersonal violence is conditioned
by state development at the time of resources discoveries.
The circumstances of mineral discoveries in the US provide an ideal natural
experiment to examine this relationship. Mineral exploration in the US was the
1See, among others, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), Rajan (2009), and Brollo et al.
(2013). See also Torvik (2009) for a review of the literature.
2
result of private and intense efforts, which were fueled by a legal specificity of
the US where minerals are private property. The territorial expansion of the US
government was driven by geopolitical factors, which were orthogonal to mineral
discoveries according to Davis et al. (1972), even when the two processes occurred
at the same time, such as in the West of the US in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury. As a result, some mineral deposits were discovered before formal institutions
were established, while others were discovered after.
The Mineral Resources Data System provides information on the location and
date of discovery of more than 17, 500 mineral discoveries in the contiguous US
since the 17th century. The Atlas of Historical County Boundaries, which docu-
ments the creation of (and subsequent changes in) the boundaries of administrative
units in the US, enables us to assess whether each discovery occurred before or af-
ter the state was established at the very place where minerals are located. We then
map this information into present-day counties and we record how many discov-
eries within a given county’s physical boundaries occurred pre- or post-statehood,
i.e. in the absence or in the presence of formal institutions. This variation allows
us to examine how the relationship between mineral resources and violence is mod-
erated by the quality of formal institutions using both historical and contemporary
measures of interpersonal violence.
We first use panel data on homicides for 63 counties across 10 states from 1790
to 1900 to show that new discoveries have a positive and statistically significant
effect on violence, but only in counties that experienced some discoveries prior
to state development. We then rely on 2000 county-level violent crimes data to
document the long-lasting and positive association between pre-statehood discov-
eries and interpersonal violence. In contrast, post-statehood discoveries are not
significantly associated with today’s violence. We find that a one standard devia-
tion increase in the number of pre-statehood mineral discoveries is associated with
an increase in today’s rate of violent crimes (homicides, assaults, and aggravated
assaults) by around 4% of the standard deviation. This figure turns out to be very
close to the effects of more traditional determinants of violence such as education
and income.
To the best of our knowledge, our findings document for the first time the exis-
tence of a homicide resource curse, which, like other resource curses, is conditional
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on the quality of initial institutions. Most existing studies have focused on orga-
nized forms of violence by rebel groups, warlords, drug gangs or mafia families,
who fill the void of a weak or absent state. In contrast, our focus is on interpersonal
violence. Our finding that the homicide resource curse hinges on the absence of
third-party enforcement is consistent with Elias (1994)’s civilizing process, which
links the secular decline in homicides to the development of a strong state that
enforces contracts and monopolizes violence. More recently, Pinker (2011) has de-
scribed the steady decline in European homicides since the emergence of modern
states in the Middle Ages. In sharp contrast with this view, other scholars have
argued that self-interest can suffice to sustain a peaceful order, even in anarchy.
In “The Not So Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier”, Anderson
and Hill argue that this was demonstrated by the private enforcement of prop-
erty rights in the West of the United States in the 19th century. However, our
findings and those offered by historical studies of homicides such as Roth (2009)
reveal that the frontier was anything but peaceful. Furthermore, we find that this
original violence has cast a long shadow on history and still persists today.
The persistence of violence implies that a relatively short term and quasi-
exogenous variation in the institutional environment in which natural resources
discoveries occurred can be associated with large and sustained differences in sub-
sequent institutional and cultural developments. Our results are indeed all the
more intriguing because we are dealing with short-lived differences in institutional
quality, since all areas in our study finally came under the control of the US gov-
ernment. We control throughout the analysis for state-level fixed effects, which
absorb any heterogeneity in today’s institutional quality across US states. Any
remaining variation in crime rates must therefore reflect variation in more local
institutions or in informal norms that sustain the use of interpersonal violence.
The interpretation of our results is that where mineral deposits were discovered
before the state was in place, violence was a very valuable means of defending
private property. Moreover, the shift in norms underlying the use of interpersonal
violence was large enough to lock these areas in a cultural-institutional equilibrium
characterized by high and persistent violence.
Our results hinge on the assumption of quasi-random variation in the rela-
tive timings of state development and mineral discovery at the precise place of
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discovery, conditional on a set of observable characteristics. We implement sev-
eral empirical strategies to demonstrate that there is no systematic relationship
between mineral discoveries and the political organization of a county. Another po-
tential threat to our identification is that pre-statehood discoveries tend to reflect
more recent institutions since, by definition, all pre-statehood discoveries occurred
before the US government gained full territorial control at the turn of the 19th
century. We therefore control for the precise date of political organization of the
county of discovery, and for an exhaustive set of historical and geographic char-
acteristics that are correlated with state development at the local level, such as
availability of water ways, agricultural suitability, terrain roughness, distance to
the state’s capital, population density, and education. We also make sure that
our results carry through when we consider only counties that are neighboring
one another or only counties that have mineral deposits, as well as when we take
into account potential spatial correlation of errors. All these strategies reduce
unobserved heterogeneity between counties but leave our results unchanged.
This paper makes contributions to three distinct strands of the literature. The
first one is to the literature on the resource curse and on how natural resources
shape cultural and institutional development in the long run.2 We show that natu-
ral resource discoveries lead to persistently higher violence—the homicide resource
curse—but only when they occur in the absence of formal institutions.
Our second contribution is to the literature on interpersonal violence. We find
that third party enforcement deters violent crime not only in the short-run as
reported by Levitt (1997), Kessler and Levitt (1999), and Draca et al. (2011), but
also in the long-run. Our results imply that even temporary breakdowns in legal
enforcement can have deleterious long-run consequences.
Finally, our results are also related to the literature on cultures of violence.
Nisbett and Cohen (1996) and Grosjean (2014) argue that the high prevalence of
homicide in the South of the US originates from the Scots-Irish who settled in the
18th century. The Scots-Irish, it is assumed, were prone to violence because they
came from lawless areas and relied on easily stolen resources. Our work provides
2See, among others, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), and Rajan (2009) for the influence
of initial endowment on institutional development. Durante (2009) and Alesina et al. (2013) link
trust and gender norms to agricultural conditions and endowments, respectively.
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a justification for this assumption by showing how, indeed, the combination of
weak formal institutions and appropriable resources spurs violence and generates
a persistent culture of violence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual background
on the relationship between rule of law and violence is discussed in Section 2.
Section 3 introduces mineral discoveries data and describes our empirical strategy.
Sections 4 and 5 provide historical and present-day evidence. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual background
Main hypothesis. Weak third-party enforcement of property rights gives rise to vi-
olence, particularly in the presence of valuable resources that can be appropriated.
This occurs because interpersonal violence and state enforcement are substitute
ways of enforcing or defending property rights. Several models characterize the
incentives to engage in violent predatory behavior when the rule of law is absent
or weak (Skaperdas 1992, Gonzalez 2012, Bisin and Verdier 2015). Beyond di-
rect expropriation, violence is also be used for preemption (Chassang and Padro´
i Miquel 2010) or in order create a reputation for being violent (Silverman 2004,
and Ghosh et al. 2013).
Applying these models’ predictions to the context of mineral exploration in the
US, we expect very different degrees of violence as a function of whether formal
institutions are in place or not at the time of discovery. If valuable minerals are
discovered when the rule of law is absent, as was the case in areas of the frontier
that had not yet come under government control, interpersonal violence will be
used to defend or enforce property rights or to build a reputation for being violent
that will deter attacks. Violence will thus prevail where the state is absent. In
contrast, there are no incentives to use interpersonal violence if resources are dis-
covered while property rights are backed by the state. The question therefore arises
as to what underlies the persistence of interpersonal violence. In other words, is it
possible that different initial institutional conditions give rise to different trajec-
tories and steady states of violence?
Channels of transmission. The first channel of persistence is the quality of in-
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stitutions. If the absence of the state rewards individuals with a comparative
advantage in violence, then these individuals will be able, through predation and
intimidation, to secure a larger share of the surplus. A classic case of political
capture may then arise when the state eventually arrives. According to Engerman
and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) and Rajan (2009), such individuals are able to use their
economic power to influence the design of formal institutions in the aim of preserv-
ing their rents, with negative long-run consequences for the quality of institutions.
The persistence of formal institutions—documented by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and
Dell (2010) among others—implies that high levels of interpersonal violence may
persist over time.
A second channel of persistence is culture. The economic environment, includ-
ing the quality of formal institutions, shapes cultural norms, which persist over
time. Tabellini (2008) and Guiso et al. (2008) study the case of social trust and
describe how parental transmission of preferences depends on the spatial pattern
of external enforcement. If formal enforcement is weak, parents might transmit
low trust in order to protect their children from situations in which they would be
taken advantage of. This results in low social trust. The same argument can easily
be extended to aggressiveness. If enforcement is weak at one period of time, the
returns to interpersonal violence are high and parents will wish their children to
internalize the benefits of using violence. Consequently, they will transmit norms
that legitimize the use of force. Elias (1994) already underlined the idea that the
development of state institutions weeds out violent social norms as agents inter-
nalize the social control of violence and even become, in the end, so civilized that
they are unable to bite another individual with any meaningful effectiveness. The
strong strategic complementarity between violent strategies—one’s propensity for
violence is increasing in the actual or expected violence of others—implies that
such a culture of violence would be highly persistent.3
Disentangling channels of transmission. In most models of culture, differences in
the initial quality of institutions give rise to different cultural norms that persist
over time regardless of subsequent changes in the quality of institutions. How-
3Young (1998) theoretically shows that norms that are mutual best responses are evolutionary
stable.
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ever, perhaps a more realistic account is that weak institutions and violent social
norms reinforce one another in a co-evolutionary process. In theoretical mod-
els by Tabellini (2008) and Belloc and Bowles (2013), institutional and cultural
persistence are complements. This complementarity gives rise to multiple sta-
ble cultural-institutional equilibria.4 Bisin and Verdier (2015) show that cultural
norms and formal institutions co-evolve, and that a temporary and exogenous
shocks to the quality of institutions can trigger large differences in long-run insti-
tutional and cultural stationary states. Our paper focuses on such a temporary
shock to the quality of initial institutions by using quasi-random variation in the
presence of state institutions at the time of mineral discoveries. The testable hy-
pothesis is that such a temporary and quasi-exogenous shock to the quality of
institutions generated differences in interpersonal violence that have persisted up
to this day.
Empirically, culture is generally identified as the residual effect of an historical
shock or event, once the contemporaneous influence of formal institutions has
been taken into account. Authors generally attempt to control for the quality
of formal institutions by focusing on regional differences within a given country
(see Guiso et al. 2008 among others) or by including country-level fixed effects in
multi-country studies (see for example Nunn and Wantchekon 2011 and Alesina
et al. 2013), based on the assumption that formal institutions vary at the country
level. In this paper, we not only focus on a single country, the US, but also include
state-level fixed effects, which absorb any unobserved potential heterogeneity in the
quality of institutions across US states. Therefore, in the traditional understanding
of the empirical literature on culture, any remaining variation associated with
the historical shock that we study in this paper could be interpreted as evidence
of cross-county differences in social norms that sustain the use of interpersonal
violence.
However, the recent literature on the co-evolution of culture and institutions
highlights that the traditional empirical identification of culture and institution
4Empirically, Grosjean (2014) and Restrepo (2015) show that the interaction between violent
cultural norms and formal institutions allows for two possible stable equilibria. Violent norms
are for example more beneficial when formal institutions are weak and are therefore reinforced.
In turn, individuals with violent cultural norms tend to favor taking justice into their own hands
and are less supportive of the development of strong formal institutions.
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as separate channels of persistence is impracticable. Differences in social norms
imply that even identical formal institutions may be enforced differently in a way
that further reinforces social norms. For example, in areas where social norms are
more encouraging and tolerant of violence, popular juries would be more lenient
towards violent offenders, and the anticipation of lighter sentences may encourage
more violence. This interpretation is consistent with the theoretical literature
on the joint evolution of institutions and culture, which views institutional and
cultural persistence as two intrinsically linked and complementary processes.
3 Data and empirical strategy
This section presents the data and the empirical strategy we adopt.
3.1 Data on natural resources and state development
The Mineral Resources Data System (MRDS) describes the location of mineral re-
sources throughout the world. For the United States, the dataset contains slightly
more than 17, 500 observations on mineral deposits for which information on the
precise location and on the year of discovery is available. The mineral resource
discoveries span the years from 1640 to 1998.5
The Atlas of Historical County Boundaries provides information about the cre-
ation and all subsequent changes in the administrative status, size, shape, location,
and dates of boundary changes of every county in the United States.6 This infor-
mation is also available for administrative areas such as colonies and territories.
We construct as many yearly maps of the administrative boundaries of counties
and states in the contiguous US as there are distinct discovery years in the MRDS.
We then project each mineral deposit on the map of administrative boundaries that
5For the sake of clarity, the discussion of the potential caveats due to the MRDS containing
observations for which the discovery date is missing is presented in a dedicated section in the
Online Appendix.
6The county is the relevant unit to study state development. A large geographic area could
be declared a state without state representation over the whole area (i.e. it could still include
unincorporated land or unorganized territory). The area would then be gradually incorporated
into counties and, once all areas are organized into counties, the full state could be considered
to be incorporated.
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corresponds to its year of discovery, and we record the administrative status of the
place of discovery at the point in time of discovery. The rule of thumb we use is to
consider that an area is politically organized at a given point in time if it belongs
to a county within a state or to a colony. In contrast, we consider as not politically
organized areas such as territories or de facto unorganized land.7 This allows us
to categorize each mineral discovery as a pre-statehood or post-statehood discovery
depending on whether it occurred before or after political organization.
Then, for each US county today, we count all of the mineral discoveries that
have ever occurred within its present-day boundaries, as well as whether each
discovery was pre- or post-statehood, according to our classification. Any issue
arising from redistricting and county boundary changes is automatically taken
into account since we only consider the status of the place of discovery at the time
of discovery.
Our independent variables of interest are the number of pre- or post-statehood
mineral discoveries within the boundaries of a given county. All in all, out of the
3, 108 counties that form the contiguous US today, 849 (27.3%) have had minerals
discovered within their boundaries. About a quarter of them (217) experienced
pre-statehood discoveries. For obvious geological reasons, places that experienced
pre-statehood discoveries are also likely to experience further discoveries. Indeed,
201 out of the 217 counties that experienced pre-statehood discoveries experienced
further discoveries after the area was incorporated into statehood.
Because each county and US state incorporated territory gradually, and because
discoveries occurred at different times, there is substantial within-state variation in
the number of counties with pre- or post-statehood discoveries. These differences
are illustrated in Figure 1 which highlights US counties with mineral resources and
shows how pre-statehood discoveries varied across the counties. The largest shares
of pre-statehood discoveries can be found in the West, where mineral exploration
and state construction occurred at the same time. Yet, thanks to the historical
span of our data, there is variation in the share of pre-statehood discoveries across
the whole territory.
7Territories refer to the territorial status between the transfer of sovereignty to the Union
and the actual establishment of formal US institutions. Even though territories were technically
under the jurisdiction of the United States, in practice law enforcement was minimal.
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Figure 2 plots together the distribution of mineral resource discoveries over
time and the territorial expansion of the US government. The solid line repre-
sents the share of the area of the present-day contiguous United States that was
integrated either into a colony or a state at each date between 1750 and today.
The dashed line represents the number of mineral discoveries occurring each year.
Both series sharply accelerated around 1825. However, while the administrative
organization of the territory was achieved by the beginning of the 20th century,
substantial mineral discoveries continued until the end of the Second World War.
The distributions displayed by Figure 2 evoke the basic source of variation we rely
on: some discoveries occurred before the land was politically organized, others
after. To display our source of identification more clearly, Figure 2 distinguishes
between mineral discoveries that occurred prior to or after political organization.
The area under the second, inner dashed line represents the share of pre-statehood
discoveries. Because the government gradually expanded over time, pre-statehood
discoveries tend to occur earlier (in fact, no pre-statehood discovery can occur after
full state incorporation of the US, that is to say after the solid line reaches 1). How-
ever, there is still substantial variation over time, with pre-statehood discoveries
spanning almost a century.
It should be noted here that although we are able to find records of mineral
discoveries prior to administrative organization of the land, no other outcome or
county characteristics is systematically available for the time period that preceded
political organization. For example, no Census data was ever collected before
an area was politically organized as an administered entity of the United States.
Therefore, even in historical regressions, we cannot observe any outcome at the
time of a pre-statehood discovery.
3.2 Data on violence
Historical crime data. Data on historical crime are from the Historical Violence
Database of the Criminal Justice Research Center at Ohio State University. This
database is a collection of datasets that have been collected by historians using
different sources such as coroner’s reports, newspaper accounts, and homicide de-
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tective reports.8 From this database, we assemble an unbalanced panel of 63
counties across 10 states from 1790 to 1900, yielding to 3, 588 county-year obser-
vations. 910 Historical crime data is matched to every wave of the US Census from
1790 to 1900—available from Haines and Inter-University Consortium for Political
& Social Research (2010)—to obtain homicide rates per 1, 000 people.11 Because
the Census is only taken every 10 years while the crime data is yearly, we linearly
extrapolate data on population at the county level.
Present day data on violence. Data on present day violence is from the Uniform
Crime Reporting (UCR) Program published by the United States Department of
Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. UCR provides information on 43
types of offenses and the monthly count of arrests for each offense from more than
17, 000 reporting agencies. Because the number of reporting agencies has been
increasing over the years, we use more recent and more reliable, data.12 Using
the 2000 Census, we construct our contemporary dependent variable of interest as
the county-level rate of violent crimes per 100, 000 people in 2000. We consider
as violent crimes offenses labeled as “murders”, “aggravated assaults”, and “other
assaults”.
3.3 Empirical strategy
Our estimation strategy involves two steps. First, we study systematic evidence on
the short-term historical relationship between mineral discoveries and violence at
8For example, Mullen (2005) gathered data on homicide in San Francisco since 1849, using
newspaper reports before the Great Earthquake of 1906 and homicide detective reports for the
years after.
9See Table A1 in the Online Appendix for the number of county-year observations available
in each state.
10Some historical samples were selected to study specific issues, such as inter-racial violence in
the case of McKanna (1997). However, none of these issues is directly related to the development
of state institutions at the time of mineral discoveries, which we study in this paper.
11Homicide is measured per 1, 000 people instead of the more standard measure per 100, 000
people because historical homicide rates are much higher than present-day homicide rates.
12As signaled by the data provider itself in its codebook, the quality of UCR data is hetero-
geneous as reporting methods can vary across agencies. We include UCR’s county-level coverage
indicator as a right-hand side variable in all estimations that use these data as an attempt to
control for variation in data quality across counties. Our results are unaffected by the inclusion
of this control.
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the county level. Second, we investigate the enduring relationship between coun-
ties’ mining and political history and violence today.
Historical analysis. We match historical data on violence with information about
yearly mining discoveries extracted from the MRDS and estimate the following
expression:
Homicideit = β0 + β1Discoveryit + β2Discoveryit × Pre-statehoodi
+δi + δt + it,
(1)
where Homicide it denotes the rate of homicides per 1, 000 people in county i at
year t, Discovery it is alternatively a dummy equal to 1 if county i experiences a
mineral discovery at year t or the number of discoveries in county i at year t, and
Pre-statehood i is a dummy equal to 1 for counties that ever experienced a pre-
statehood discovery, according to our classification detailed in Section 3.1. The
panel-structure of our historical data enables us to introduce year fixed effects (δt)
and county fixed effects (δi) in order to account for common time-shocks and time-
invariant county characteristics, respectively. it is the error term. We estimate
expression (1) using ordinary least squares and cluster errors at the county level.
β1 should be interpreted as the average relation between discoveries and homicides,
while β2 signals whether the former relationship is conditioned by the past mining
and political history of the counties.
Present-day evidence. To examine the relationship between violence today and
counties’ mining and political history, we estimate the following specification:
Violencei = β0 + β1Post-statehood discoveriesi
+β2Pre-statehood discoveriesi + Xi
′β3 + δs(i) + εi,
(2)
where Violence i is the violent crime rate per 100, 000 people in county i in 2000.
Variables Post- and Pre-statehood discoveriesi denote the number of mines per 0.1
square mile that were discovered in county i after or before formal institutions were
established. Note that scaling these variables by a county’s size allows us to ensure
their comparability across counties of various sizes. Xi is a vector of county-level
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covariates that we describe as we introduce them. δs(i) is a vector of state fixed
effects that enable us to account for potential regional differences in crimes rate
and variation in institutional quality across states, and εi is the error term. We
estimate expression (2) using ordinary least squares and cluster errors at the state
level. The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: β1 captures the relationship
between discoveries that occurred after the land was already politically organized
and today’s violent crimes; β2 captures the relationship between discoveries that
occurred when the land was not yet administratively organized and today’s violent
crimes.
Independence of state development and mineral discoveries. We use variation in
the respective timings of mineral discovery and state development as the source
of identification to estimate the effect of state development on violence. The
underlying identification assumption is that, conditional on a set of observable
characteristics, there is quasi-random variation in the timing of state development
around the time of mineral discoveries. We discuss two particular facts in American
economic history that support this hypothesis, and we implement two empirical
tests which support each of these facts.
First, Davis et al. (1972) argues that the US government territorial expansion
was largely driven by population pressure and external geo-political forces, which
are hopefully not correlated with the location of mineral resources. Table 1 helps
illustrate this claim. We analyze the relative explanatory power of different deter-
minants of counties’ political organization dates. The table displays the estimates
and the adjusted R-squared from regressions of the date at which the territory
of a county was first administratively organized into a colony or state on various
explanatory variables.13 As shown by column 1, counties with mineral resources
were organized sooner than others. However, mineral resources endowment only
explains 0.7% of the variation in political organization dates. By contrast, ge-
ographical characteristics such as latitude and longitude, agricultural suitability,
elevation, roughness of terrain, or local rivers’ length each explain between 7 and
49% of the variation in organization dates as shown by adjusted R-squareds of
columns 2–5. Simultaneously including all of these variables other than mineral
13See Table A8 in the Online Appendix for sources and definitions of explanatory variables.
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discoveries as explanatory variables pushes the adjusted R-squared up to 55%. This
sharply contrasts with the low explanatory power of mineral resources endowments
and advocates against the presence of minerals being an important driver of land’s
political organization.
Because these geographic characteristics explain a substantial part of the vari-
ation across dates of political organization, we include them in the set of controls
in Xi in equation (2). The date of a county’s political organization may also influ-
ence crime directly, because the quality of formal institutions may depend on how
long formal institutions have been in place in a given county. In order to account
for such potential differences in the quality of institutions across counties, we also
include the date of political organization of the county in the vector of covariates.
Last, we also include in Xi a set of historical socio-economic characteristics that
could be correlated with the date of political organization, the quality of formal
institutions and long-run trends in crime, and which reflect population density,
education, economic inequality, poverty and ethnic fractionalization.
The second fact in American mining history that argues in favor of the in-
dependence of discoveries from the precise date of political organization is that
mineral exploration in the US occurred in a rather unorganized “rush”. According
to Wright (1990), the most distinctive feature of the American mining economy
was the intensity of exploration and exploitation. This was due to a particularly
rewarding incentive system, in which, as opposed to most other countries in the
world, mineral rights were included in the bundle of land rights (David and Wright
1995). Exploration was to a large extent a private enterprise, in what Clay and
Wright (2011) describe as an open and saturated market. As an illustration, in
around 1850, miners in California earned on average less in relative terms than day
laborers in other parts of the United States, an indication that open entry gave
way to a dissipation of rents (Clay and Jones 2008). Taken together, such a private
and massive search in a market with open entry—the mineral rush—suggests that
specific mineral discoveries were largely independent from the political status of
the place of discovery at the time of discovery.
We empirically check for this independence by computing the residuals from
a regression of yearly local discoveries on a set of county and year fixed effects.
County fixed effects wash out the local mineral potential, while year fixed effects
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take into account population pressure, variation in the price of minerals and the
evolution of any relevant technology. We then average these residuals across time
to and from the date at which a county’s land was politically organized. Figure 3
plots such residuals within a 10-year window around the political organization of
the county. Since, as depicted by Figure 2, mineral discoveries and county political
organization tended to occur at the same time, residuals are positive around the
date of political organization. However, the pattern of the residuals is not different
before and after the date of political organization. This confirms that there is no
particular association between administrative status and the number of mineral
discoveries in a given county around the date of political organization.
Other threats to identification. Our identification method relies on a comparison
across counties within the same state. A threat to our identification strategy
could consist of the unobserved heterogeneity in mining and political histories
across counties. First, a county may have been affected by the mining history of its
immediate neighbors rather than more distant counties even within the same state.
This would imply that the relevant comparison group may not be any county in
the same state but only neighboring ones and that the error term in equation (2)
is spatially correlated and not independently and identically distributed within
a state. A second and related concern is that mineral resources endowment is
not evenly distributed across space: minerals tend to be clustered geographically.
Finally, counties located near state boundaries may share some characteristics
with counties on the other side of the state border, which are not captured by
state fixed effects. We present numerous strategies to tackle these different threats
in sub-section 5.2.
4 Historical evidence
In this section, we present evidence that the historical relationship between mineral
discoveries and interpersonal violence depends on the political circumstances of
mineral discoveries.
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4.1 Descriptive statistics and main results
Descriptive statistics. Our sample is a non-balanced panel of 63 counties across 10
states from 1790 to 1900. 14 of these counties experienced mineral discoveries, and
some discoveries occurred before administrative organization in 5 of the counties.14
For these 5 counties there is an average of 0.26 discoveries a year with a maximum
of 5 discoveries. For counties that did not experience pre-statehood discoveries,
there is on average 0.08 discoveries a year with a maximum of 6 discoveries.
In counties with pre-statehood discoveries, the average yearly homicide rate
reaches 0.24 per 1, 000 inhabitants. It is larger than the corresponding figure
in counties without any mineral discoveries (0.07). It is also higher compared
to counties that only experienced mineral discoveries after political organization
(0.10).15 This simple cross-section evidence illustrates the fact that even back
in the past, counties that experienced mineral discoveries prior to administrative
organization were more violent than other counties.
Within the sample of counties endowed with mineral resources, the average
homicide rate during the years where mineral discoveries occurred is 0.34 per
1, 000 inhabitants. It is 4 times larger than the average homicide rate during years
without discoveries (0.09).16 This depicts the within-county time-variation we ex-
ploit to estimate equation (1).
Main results. Estimates of equation (1) are presented in Table 2.17 In the first
column, without year and county fixed effects, the coefficient associated with the
discovery of mineral resources is positive and statistically significant. However,
this conflates potential differences between mining and non-mining areas that are
fixed over time, potential trends in violence that are correlated with the timing
14The 5 counties that experience pre-statehood discoveries are Augusta (Virginia), Calaveras
(California), Gila (Arizona), Sacramento (California), and Tuolumne (California). It represents
6.4% of county-year observations.
15Formal tests of the differences between 0.24 and 0.10 or 0.07 suggest that they are statisti-
cally significant, with t-statistics equal to 4.7 and 8.4, respectively.
16A formal test of the difference between 0.34 and 0.09 provides a t-statistic equal to 7.4 and
confirms that the difference is statistically significant.
17Note that counties that never experienced mineral resource discoveries do not help us directly
to estimate equation (1)’s coefficients of interest. However, they do help us to estimate time fixed
effects capturing common time-shocks that might influence violence during specific years.
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of mineral exploitation, as well as the contemporaneous effect of mineral discov-
eries on violence. To isolate the third channel, we include year and county fixed
effects in column 2 and thereafter. County fixed effects absorb the effect of any
unobservable but time-invariant differences between mining and non-mining areas
that could influence the level of violence. Year fixed effects deal with any potential
secular trend in violence that could be correlated with mining activity. With the
inclusion of time and year fixed effects, the coefficient associated with the discovery
of mineral resources is no longer significant. This indicates that mineral discoveries
per se are not conducive to violence. However, when we take into account coun-
ties’ political histories, the story is different. In counties that experienced some
discoveries prior to state development, every new discovery has a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on violence. In column 3, the coefficient associated with
the interaction term between the discovery of mineral resources and the dummy
variable that indicates whether there were discoveries before political organization
is positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect of pre-state
discoveries is substantial. According to the estimates presented in column 3 of
Table 2, a mineral discovery in a pre-statehood county is associated with a spike
in the rate of violent crime by almost 100%.
In columns 4 to 6, we document that this finding holds when considering the
intensive rather than the extensive margin, i.e. using the yearly number of mineral
discoveries instead of a dummy, or when we impose restrictions on minerals, e.g.
when we consider gold discoveries only. Note that the coefficients associated with
mineral discoveries and with the interaction term are both statistically significant
in column 4. However, the coefficient associated with the interaction term is larger
in magnitude than the coefficient associated with discoveries and still positive. In
columns 5 and 6, we observe a slight increase in the magnitude of the coefficient
of the interaction term as we focus on gold, an ore that is more valuable. This
observation matches the intuition that the relationship between mineral discoveries
and violence should be stronger for more valuable resources.
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4.2 Robustness
Spatial correlation. Counties that are geographically close to one another may
be influenced by common characteristics that could affect both their mining and
political history, as well as prevailing violence. For example, minerals tend to be
geographically clustered. Governmental territorial expansion also had a spatial di-
mension, with places near the frontier more likely to become politically organized
and also benefit from some third party enforcement compared with places further
away from the frontier. We use the estimation method pioneered by Conley (1999,
2008) and further developed by Hsiang (2010) to deal with the resulting potential
spatial correlation in the error term of expression (1). In columns 1 and 2 of Table
A2, presented in the Online Appendix, standard errors are adjusted for spatial
correlation within a 100- and 500-kilometers radius. Standard errors appear to be
very similar to those displayed in column 3 of Table 2.
Heterogeneity arising from trends. Our identification strategy relies on within
county variation and on the assumption that all the counties in our sample would
have experienced similar trends in the absence of additional discoveries. We relax
this assumption and add county-specific time trends in column 3 of Table A2 to
ensure that our result is not driven by the heterogeneity arising from trends in
homicide rates that may be correlated with mineral discoveries within a county.
The magnitude of the point estimate of the interaction term is unaffected.
Outliers. Columns 4–6 of Table A2 display two approaches that allow us to ensure
that our estimates of interest are not driven by counties with outlying rates of
violence. Our estimate is not affected by a log-transformation of the dependent
variable, nor by excluding 2- and 3-sigma outliers.
To conclude, we find that mineral discoveries were associated with contempo-
raneous spikes in violence, but only in counties where some minerals had been
discovered before state development. We now study whether violence has endured




In this section, we present evidence that violence is still, today, related to counties’
mining and political history.
5.1 Results
The first column of Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients obtained when esti-
mating equation (2) on the population of the 3, 108 counties in the contiguous US
without the vector of covariates. The coefficients associated with pre- and post-
statehood discoveries are both statistically significant. However, the coefficient
associated with pre-statehood discoveries is more than 5 times larger in magnitude
and positive, whereas the coefficient associated with post-statehood discoveries is
negative. This suggests that while counties that only experienced mineral discov-
eries after political organization tend to experience less violence than non-mining
counties, areas where mineral discoveries occurred before political organization ex-
perience, today, more violent crime than either type of counties. As we will see
in the rest of this section, only the positive effect of pre-statehood discoveries on
violence remains robust to additional tests.
Columns 2–4 of Table 3 present the evolution of coefficients of interest when
introducing different sets of county-level covariates in equation (2).18 A county’s
political history may have an influence on present-day violence not only through its
interaction with mining history but also directly, through an institutional quality
channel. To account for this, we control for the date of political organization, as
well as for the covariates that were shown to influence the date at which political
organization occurred, according to the analysis performed in Table 1. We also
include other county characteristics that are fixed over time and that could be cor-
related with mining and political history and violence today. These include total
land area (to wash out size effects), distance to the state’s capital (to take remote-
ness into account), and a dummy indicating the presence of oil or gas resources
(to account for other geological resources). Including these covariates increases
the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of pre-statehood mineral discoveries,
18Summary statistics and estimates of covariates are displayed in Table A3, presented in the
Online Appendix.
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while it decreases the magnitude and the statistical significance of the coefficient
on post-statehood discoveries.
The second set of covariates consists of socio-economic variables measured in
2000 that might influence crime, such as education (proxied by the share of pop-
ulation with a high school degree), inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient),
population density, per capita income, black share of the population, and ethnic
fractionalization. Introducing these variables leaves the statistical significance and
the magnitude of pre-statehood discoveries unchanged compared to column 1 but
reduces the magnitude of the coefficient of post-statehood discoveries, which is no
longer statistically significant. Arguably, some of these present-day county char-
acteristics may have been influenced by a county’s mining history and including
them in the regression may bias coefficients on the variables capturing mining his-
tory. However, it is reassuring to observe that the magnitude of the coefficient
on pre-statehood discoveries is hardly affected by the inclusion of these controls,
while the overall fit of the regression improves, with the R-squared increasing from
0.46 to 0.53.
Third, we check that our results are robust to controlling for historical covari-
ates that aim to capture socio-economic conditions in the distant past. This set
includes: male literacy rate in 1900, population density, share of urban popula-
tion, shares of women and non-whites, per capita farming output and per capita
manufacturing output in 1880. The choice of 1880 and 1900 as measurement dates
is the result of a compromise between data availability and our wish to get as
close as possible to the moment where minerals were discovered and the land was
organized. As a result, the sample size is smaller.19 However, introducing these
variables preserves our main result: mineral discoveries that occurred before po-
litical organization are associated with more violent crime today, whereas this is
not the case for mineral resources discovered later in a county’s history.
19The extent of selection into this sample can be explored by investigating how different
observable characteristics affect the probability of a county falling into this sample. It turns out
that the R-squared of a linear probability model whose dependent variable is equal to one for
counties included in the reduced sample and whose right-hand side variable is mineral endowment
equals 0.0004. In contrast, using the vector of geographic covariates as explanatory variables
produced a R-squared that reaches 0.20. This finding suggests than our variables of interest
are not key determinants of sample selection and that further taking into account geographic
features is important.
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Finally, we simultaneously include the three sets of covariates as shown by
column 5 of Table 3. The coefficient associated with pre-statehood mineral discov-
eries is still negative, statistically significant and of the same order of magnitude.
Meanwhile, minerals discovered after state institutions were in place have no last-
ing influence on violence.
Potential omitted variables. The stability of the coefficient of interest when simul-
taneously including our three sets of different covariates is reassuring concerning
potential omitted variable bias. In order to apply the general estimator proposed
by Oster (2015), we compare the estimate of pre-statehood discoveries from the
fifth column of Table 3 with the one obtained when using the first column’s spec-
ification and restricting the sample to counties used in fifth column. We find that
the influence of unobservable variables would need to be 1.13 times more impor-
tant than that of all the already included observable variables to totally suppress
the effect of pre-statehood discoveries.20
Magnitude. The magnitude of the enduring effect of pre-statehood discoveries is
substantial. According to the estimates presented in the last column of Table 3,
a one standard deviation change in pre-statehood mineral discoveries is associ-
ated with an increase in the rate of violent crime that amounts to around 4% of
the standard deviation of violent crime rates. This is very close to the effect of
more traditional determinants of violence such as education and income. Summary
statistics and covariates’ estimates, presented in Online Appendix’ Table A3, in-
dicate that one standard deviation change in the high school graduation rate or in
per capita income are each associated with 5% changes in the standard deviation
of violent crime rates.
Alternative results. We have so far included all types of minerals in empirical
20Note that 1.13 exceeds 1, the critical value recommended by Oster (2015). We follow the
recommendation by Oster (2015) and assume that the maximum achievable R-squared exceeds
by 30% the one obtained when including all observable covariates. With the most conservative
hypothesis, i.e. assuming that the maximum achievable R-squared is 1, we still find that the
influence of unobservable variables would need to be 1.07 times larger than the influence of all
included observable variables to make the effect of our variable of interest go away.
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specifications. Table A4 in the Online Appendix displays estimates that mirror
those in columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 for different kinds of minerals. We first restrict
ourselves to metallic minerals. Our estimates are unchanged. We then focus on
silver and gold. While the main message conveyed by these estimates remains
unchanged, we observe a slight increase in the magnitude of the coefficient of pre-
statehood discoveries as we focus on more valuable ores, which is consistent with
our intuition.
Our story relies exclusively on the persistence of interpersonal violence. As
a placebo exercise, we check whether pre-statehood discoveries translate into all
forms of criminality. We achieve this by replacing our dependent variable with
different crimes rates: property crimes, drug crimes, and all other crimes. As
shown by the estimates displayed in Table A5, pre-statehood discoveries hardly
have any effect on these different measures of crime rates, giving a hand to our
story of persistence of interpersonal violence.
5.2 Threats to identification
As already mentioned, our identification method relies on a comparison across
counties within the same state. We account for the possibility that unobservable
characteristics that are specific to each state influenced the respective timings of
mineral discoveries and political development and may impact violence today in
two ways: by including state fixed effects and by accounting for a group structure
of the error term at the state level. While state level variation may capture much of
the unobserved variation in political development, it may not necessarily capture
all the relevant unobserved heterogeneity in mining and political histories across
counties: (i) a county may have been affected by the mining history of its immedi-
ate neighbors; (ii) mineral resource endowments are not evenly distributed across
space for intrinsic geological reasons; (iii) counties located near state boundaries
may share some characteristics with counties on the other side of the state border.
We present below the various strategies we use to tackle these spatial issues, as
well as other threats to identification.
Spatial correlation. We first use the estimation method pioneered by Conley (1999,
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2008) and further developed by Hsiang (2010) to take into account spatial correla-
tion. In column 1–6 of Table 4, standard errors are adjusted for spatial correlation
within a 100-, 300-, and 500-kilometers radius. Standard errors are very similar to
those displayed in Table 3.
Mining counties and neighbors. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 present estimates
obtained when we restrict the sample to counties that are either mining counties
or that are immediate neighbors of mining counties. This restricts the sample to
around 1, 500 counties. Yet, the point estimate of the variable of interest remains
of the same order of magnitude. We go further in columns 9 and 10 by restricting
the sample to counties that have mineral deposits, i.e. we exclude neighboring
counties without mineral resources. Even though the sample is further reduced to
less than 1, 000 county observations, the coefficient associated with pre-statehood
discoveries is still negative, statistically significant at the 1% level and of the same
order of magnitude as in Table 3. Meanwhile, the coefficient associated with post-
statehood discoveries is not statistically significant and converging towards zero.
This confirms that only pre-statehood discoveries are associated with violence in
a positive, robust and consistent fashion.
Alternative levels of fixed effects. In columns 11–16 of Table 4, we correct for the
fact that state borders may not fully capture all the relevant unobserved hetero-
geneity in counties’ mining and political history. We divide the contiguous US
territory into arbitrary 2−, 5− and 7−degree grids and use the resulting groups to
construct geographic fixed effects that may better capture unobserved heterogene-
ity in geological factors or in the progression of the US government. The resulting
groups consist of 245, 49, or 29 arbitrary states. The coefficient associated with
pre-statehood discoveries declines in magnitude and becomes less precisely esti-
mated the wider the squares of the grid, but remains positive and statistically
significant. Again, the coefficient associated with post-statehood discoveries is no
longer statistically significant in all of these specifications.
Timing of the mining activity. A noteworthy concern regarding our identification
strategy is that we compare mineral discoveries that occurred before county polit-
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ical organization to those that occurred anytime since. As displayed in Figure 2
and discussed in Section 3, county political organization was completed by the first
years of the 20th century and pre-statehood discoveries thus tend to happen earlier
than post-statehood discoveries (as we have already commented, by definition, no
pre-statehood discovery can occur after the full territory came under government
control). One may thus worry that we do not capture an effect due to the absence
or presence of state institutions at the moment of discoveries, but rather simply an
effect due to more ancient mining activity. Also, more recent discoveries have of
course occurred under completely different technological and economic conditions
than earlier ones. Figure 4 helps us address these issues. It displays the estimated
coefficients of pre- and post-statehood discoveries as we progressively increase the
time window before and after county political organization. We use the specifica-
tion used in column 5 of Table 3. Each set of estimated coefficients correspond
to a different regression with a different time window. The first set displays the
estimated coefficients and standard errors when we consider only discoveries that
occurred either 10 years before or 10 years after political organization. The second
set displays the same statistics when we consider all the discoveries that occur
within 20 years of county political organization. And so on and so forth until
100 years. The coefficient associated with pre-statehood discoveries is remarkably
stable as we expand this time window. In other words, the positive coefficient es-
timated for pre-statehood discoveries is mainly driven by discoveries that occurred
up to 10 years before administrative organization of the land. Further expanding
the observation window to include older discoveries does not change the estimated
coefficient. By contrast, the forward expansion of the window to take into account
more recent discoveries increases the precision of the non-significant coefficient of
post-statehood discoveries, which clearly becomes zero.
Outliers. Table A6, presented in the Online Appendix, displays different ap-
proaches that allow us to ensure that our estimates of interest are not driven
by outlying counties. As shown by the estimated coefficients presented in columns
1 and 2, our estimates are not affected by a log-transformation of the dependent
variable. In columns 3 and 4, and 5 and 6, we exclude counties that belong to the
bottom and top 5% of the distributions of violence and mines, respectively. This
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allows us to sequentially remove potential outliers in terms of the dependent and
the independent variables. We combine both approaches by excluding counties
that meet any of these two criteria in columns 7 and 8. Our estimate of interest is
not substantially affected. Columns 9–12 convey a similar message by excluding
counties for which the overall model performs poorly and produces residuals that
exceed 2- and 3-standard deviations.
Randomly allocated discoveries. As an additional illustration of our identification
strategy, we undertake two placebo tests portrayed by Figure A1 in the Online
Appendix. The placebo tests consist of randomly re-allocating mineral resources
discoveries across either time or space and re-estimating the relation we are in-
terested in. Randomization across time is achieved by randomizing the share of
minerals discovered in a county pre- or post-statehood, taking the total number
of mineral discoveries in the county. Randomization across space is achieved by
randomly allocating mineral discoveries to counties, keeping constant the overall
distribution of minerals across countries. We implemented each approach 1, 000
times. Hardly any of the allocations we created managed to reproduce the coeffi-
cient of pre-statehood discoveries estimated on observed data.
5.3 Interpretation
We find robust evidence that prevailing violence today is influenced by the spe-
cific circumstances of mineral discoveries in the US. We find that counties where
minerals were discovered before the state was established experience higher inter-
personal violence, and the magnitude of the effect is substantial.
These results hold even though we control throughout for state-level fixed ef-
fects, which absorb much of the variation in the quality of formal institutions across
the US. The remaining variation in homicide rates is suggestive of the presence of
differences in cultural norms that sustain the use of interpersonal violence.
Yet, we cannot fully rule out that institutions vary at a very local level, poten-
tially even as a result of differences in cultural norms. Indeed, if cultural norms
towards violence are different, even similar formal institutions may be enforced
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and implemented in a different way, which might in turn reinforce cultural norms.
For example, in areas where social norms are more encouraging and tolerant of
violence, popular juries will be more lenient towards violent offenders, and the
anticipation of lighter sentences may encourage more violence. In fact, we view
cultural and institutional persistence as two intrinsically linked processes that re-
inforce one another.
Overall, the interpretation of our results is that where formal institutions were
absent at the time of mineral discoveries, interpersonal violence was a very valu-
able strategy to defend and enforce property rights over minerals. As a result,
high levels of violence prevailed, and both attitudes towards the use of violence
and the tendency to resort to violence shifted. Such a culture of violence also
potentially affected how formal institutions were enforced. These areas were sub-
sequently locked in a cultural-institutional equilibrium characterized by a high
level of violence, despite subsequent changes to the quality of formal institutions.
6 Conclusion
This work documents the negative short- and long-run consequences of mineral
discoveries in the context of weak polities. It uncovers the existence of a homicide
resource curse, which is conditional on the quality of initial formal institutions. In
areas of the US where mineral discoveries occurred before the state was established,
higher levels of interpersonal violence prevailed historically and have persisted until
today.
We argue and document that there is no systematic association between mineral
discoveries and state development at the local level we consider in this paper.
Furthermore, we find that our results are driven by discoveries that occur within
10 years of state incorporation. This suggests that a relatively short-term and
quasi-exogenous variation in the institutional environment can lead to large and
persistent differences in subsequent cultural and institutional development. The
implications are substantial, in light of a growing body of evidence on the effects
of cultural norms and institutions on economic growth and development.
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Figure 1: US counties’ mining history.
Sources: Atlas of Historical County Boundaries and Mineral Resources Data System. White counties are counties
that never experienced mineral resource discoveries. Grey counties experienced mineral resource discoveries only
once land was administratively organized. Red-colored counties experienced some mineral resource discoveries
before land was administratively organized. Brighter red indicates a higher share of such discoveries.
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Figure 2: Political organization and mineral discoveries over time.
Sources: Atlas of Historical County Boundaries and Mineral Resources Data System. The cumulative distribution
of counties’ political organization is built based on present-day counties’ boundaries but takes redistricting into
account as explained in Section 3. The distributions of mineral discoveries have been smoothed for graphical
considerations. The top line has been smoothed using a 20-year window. The bottom line, i.e. the one that
distinguishes between discoveries made before or after the land was politically organized, has been smoothed
using a 5-year forward-looking window.
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Figure 3: Residual discoveries around political organization of the place of discov-
ery.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from the Atlas of Historical County Boundaries and the Mineral Resources Data
System. Residual discoveries per county is the residual from a regression of yearly mineral discoveries that took
place within a county’s boundaries on a set of year and county fixed effects.
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Figure 4: Varying the observation window for discoveries.
The figure plots the estimated coefficients of pre- and post-statehood mineral discoveries when varying the time
window within which we observe discoveries around the date of political organization. Estimates are those obtained
using the specification displayed in column 5 of Table 3. Estimates for the 10- and 20-year windows have been
shifted horizontally for aesthetic considerations.
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Table 1: Determinants of county-level political organization dates.
Dependent variable: date at which a county’s land was first politically organized (colony or state)







Mean agricultural suitability 53.27*** 46.75***
(3.01) (2.56)
Mean elevation 0.05*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00)
Standard deviation of elevation -0.40*** -0.15***
(0.04) (0.02)
Total rivers’ length 0.04*** -0.00**
(0.00) (0.00)
Observations 3,108 3,108 3,105 3,108 3,108 3,105
Adjusted R-squared 0.007 0.487 0.087 0.177 0.068 0.550
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS regressions. Each column presents the estimates from a separate regression.
The unit of observation is a county. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. Mineral discoveries is
the number of mineral discoveries per 0.1 square mile. All regressions include a constant term. See Table A8 in
the Online Appendix for sources and definitions of other variables.
37
Table 2: Historical evidence on mineral discoveries and homicide: 1790 to 1900 in
an unbalanced panel of counties.
Dependent variable: yearly rate of homicide per 1, 000 inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Discovery 0.26** -0.03 -0.14 -0.07
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Discovery × pre-statehood 0.22* 0.31*
(0.12) (0.19)
Number of discoveries -0.09*** -0.04
(0.03) (0.04)
Number of discoveries × pre-statehood 0.14*** 0.15**
(0.03) (0.07)
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gold only Yes Yes
Observations 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,588 3,588
R-squared 0.02 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.30
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS regressions. Each column presents estimates from a separate regression.
The unit of observation is a county-year. White heteroskedastic standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
county level in parentheses. Discovery is a dummy equal to 1 if county i experiments a mineral discovery in
a given year. Pre-statehood is a dummy variable equal to 1 for counties that ever experienced a pre-statehood
discovery. Gold is the only mineral resource taken into account to construct the variables used in columns 5 and
6. All regressions include a constant term. Online Appendix’ Table A1 presents sources used to construct the
sample.
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Table 3: Political and mining history and present-day violent crime.
Dependent variable: rate of violent crime per 100, 000 inhabitants in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-statehood discoveries -79.63*** -56.37 -8.77 -43.33 -11.71
(28.37) (35.11) (25.87) (26.07) (28.71)
Pre-statehood discoveries 423.06*** 512.80*** 443.65*** 294.67*** 357.10***
(79.81) (91.74) (93.03) (108.79) (90.17)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes
Contemporary controls Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes
Observations 3,108 3,108 3,054 2,484 2,460
R-squared 0.46 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.56
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS regressions. Each column presents the estimates from a separate regression. The unit of observation
is a county. White heteroskedastic standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level in parentheses. Violent crimes include murders,
aggravated assaults, and other assaults. Pre- and Post-statehood discoveries are the numbers of mineral discoveries per 0.1 square mile that
have been discovered before and after political organization, respectively. All regressions include a constant term and UCR’s county-level
coverage indicator. Geographic controls: total land area, mean and standard deviation of elevation, agricultural suitability, total length of
rivers, a dummy indicating the presence of oil or gas resources, distance to the state’s capital, the date at which the county’s land was first
politically organized, latitude, and longitude. Contemporary controls are measured in 2000: share of population with high school degree, Gini
coefficient, population density, per capita income, share of blacks, and ethnic fractionalization. Historical controls: male literacy rate in 1900,
population density, share of urban population, share of women, share of non-whites, per capita farming output and per capita manufacturing
output in 1880. Summary statistics and covariates’ estimates are presented in Online Appendix Table A3. See Table A8 in the Online
Appendix for sources and definitions of covariates.
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Table 4: Political and mining history and present-day violent crime: Robustness to spatial issues.
Dependent variable: rate of violent crime per 100, 000 inhabitants in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post-statehood discoveries -79.63** -11.71 -79.63** -11.71 -79.63*** -11.71 -57.70** -1.64
(34.06) (30.39) (36.93) (29.84) (27.14) (29.61) (24.11) (29.06)
Pre-statehood discoveries 423.06*** 357.10*** 423.06*** 357.10*** 423.06*** 357.10*** 403.49*** 368.36***
(87.03) (104.95) (89.84) (89.08) (51.34) (53.57) (79.55) (88.47)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemporary controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spatial correlation adjustment 100 km 100 km 300 km 300 km 500 km 500 km
Only neighboring counties Yes Yes
Observations 3,108 2,460 3,108 2,460 3,108 2,460 1,725 1,313
R-squared 0.46 0.56 0.46 0.56 0.46 0.56 0.48 0.56
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Post-statehood discoveries -14.11 25.95 -41.70 -14.04 -7.06 -19.51 -31.40 -22.85
(22.28) (31.21) (47.87) (39.90) (83.80) (46.55) (72.62) (53.46)
Pre-statehood discoveries 324.78*** 380.76*** 347.22*** 373.71*** 283.90** 370.25*** 265.70** 383.83***
(80.71) (90.89) (108.10) (107.61) (108.55) (108.31) (107.65) (91.55)
State fixed effects Yes Yes
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemporary controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Only counties with minerals Yes Yes
Arbitrary state fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of arbitrary states 245 215 49 49 29 29
Observations 849 658 3,108 2,460 3,108 2,460 3,108 2,460
R-squared 0.44 0.57 0.43 0.52 0.33 0.45 0.26 0.41
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OLS regressions. Each column presents the estimates from a separate regression. The unit of observation
is a county. All regressions include a constant term and UCR’s county-level coverage indicator. Standard errors in parentheses. In columns
1–6, standard errors are computed following Conley (1999, 2008) and Hsiang (2010) and using 100-, 300-, and 500-km spatial adjustments. In
columns 7–10, White heteroskedastic standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. In columns 11–16, White heteroskedastic
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the arbitrary state level. Arbitrary states are cells of 2-, 5-, and 7-degree grids. Violent crimes
include murders, aggravated assaults, and other assaults. Pre- and Post-statehood discoveries are the numbers of mineral discoveries per 0.1
square mile that have been discovered before and after political organization, respectively. All regressions include a constant term. Geographic
controls: total land area, mean and standard deviation of elevation, agricultural suitability, total length of rivers, a dummy indicating the
presence of oil or gas resources, distance to the state’s capital, the date at which the county’s land was first politically organized, latitude, and
longitude. Contemporary controls are measured in 2000: share of population with high school degree, Gini coefficient, population density, per
capita income, share of blacks, and ethnic fractionalization. Historical controls: male literacy rate in 1900, population density, share of urban
population, share of women, share of non-whites, per capita farming output and per capita manufacturing output in 1880. See Table A8 in
the Online Appendix for sources and definitions of covariates.
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